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19751 CASE COMMENTS
Municipal Corporations-RENT CONTROL-CITY OF MIAMI BEACH MAY
ENACT RENT CONTROL ORDINANCE UNDER MUNICIPAL HOME RULE
POWERS ACT-City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So.
2d 764 (Fla. 1974).
Since 1969 the City of Miami Beach has sought to pass a rent
control ordinance. The first such ordinance cited a finding that an
inflationary rent spiral and a housing shortage required the remedial
action;1 the plight of low income retired persons appears to have
been particularly in mind.2 This ordinance was struck down by the
Florida Supreme Court in City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel,
Inc.3 The court there held that the home rule provisions of the 1968
Florida Constitution,4 absent enabling legislation, did not empower
the city to enact rent controls. 5 The court also declared that an in-
flationary spiral was not an emergency sufficient to justify rent con-
trols;6 that the ordinance lacked sufficient objective guidelines and
standards and thus constituted an unlawful delegation of authority to
the city rent agency;7 and that the ordinance conflicted with landlord-
tenant provisions of the Florida statutes."
In the subsequent session the Florida Legislature passed the
Municipal Home Rule Powers Act.9 Miami Beach again attempted to
control rents.10 The second ordinance was designed to meet the
1. Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 1791, Oct. 15, 1969.
2. See City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 809 (Fla. 1972)
(Ervin, J., dissenting).
3. 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972).
4. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b).
5. 261 So. 2d at 804. For a discussion of the home rule aspects of the case see 1
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 360 (1973). That comment found the Fleetwood court's conclusion
questionable in light of the plain language of the constitutional home rule section,
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b), and in light of statutory provisions allowing cities to
amend their charters and exercise any power not prohibited by general or special
law. See Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-242, § 1; ch. 69-33, §§ 1, 2 (repealed 1973).
6. 261 So. 2d at 804. As to the requirement that rent control be justified by
emergency conditions, see Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242
(1922); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsh, 256
U.S. 135 (1921); Kress, Dunlap & Lane, Ltd. v. Downing, 193 F. Supp. 874 (D.V.I. 1961).
7. 261 So. 2d at 805-06.
8. Id. at 806.
9. FLA. STAT. §§ 166.011-.042 (1973).
10. The Act became effective October 1, 1973. The city enacted rent control in the
following months, amending and rewriting its ordinance several times. All references
hereinafter to "the ordinance" refer to Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 73-1978, Dec.
31, 1973, upon which the city relied at the trial. Brief for Appellee at 2, City of Miami
Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974).
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difficulties encountered in court by its predecessor." Almost im-
mediately a Miami Beach landlord attacked the ordinance, and the
Act under which it was passed, in Dade County Circuit Court. The
circuit court held, under Fleetwood Hotel, that the ordinance lacked
sufficient objective guidelines and standards, that it conflicted with
Florida landlord-tenant and probate law, and that the Municipal
Home Rule Powers Act itself was invalid under article III, section 1,
and article VIII of the 1968 Florida constitution.12 The city appealed.
In City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc.,1 3 the Florida Supreme
Court unanimously upheld the home rule act and the power to pass
rent control thereunder. But a divided court held that in attempting
to delegate such power to the administrator the city had provided
insufficient guidelines, and thus the ordinance was invalid. 4
Despite the court's failure to uphold the Miami Beach ordinance,
Forte Towers is a substantial victory for Florida's cities and towns.
Traditionally bound by Dillon's Rule, municipalities possessed only
those powers expressed or implied in a legislative delegation, or in-
dispensible to municipal purpose. 5 The rule served to keep municipali-
11. The 1969 ordinance posited the use of emergency power on an "inflationary
spiral" and a "housing shortage." Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 1791, § 1, Oct. 15, 1969.
The Fleetwood court found an increase in the cost of living alone inadequate to
justify rent control. 261 So. 2d at 804. The 1973 ordinance contained a more elaborate
justification, invoking the "health, safety and general welfare of the citizens of Miami
Beach." Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 73-1978, § l(a), Dec. 31, 1973.
The 1973 ordinance also sought to rectify the lack of sufficient guidelines and
standards. Rents were affixed by registration of the rates charged on October 1, 1973.
Adjustments were to be made, not by the "equities of the matter," as in the earlier
ordinance, but on the basis of a schedule tied to cost-of-living and tax increases.
Further adjustments were to be allowed for specifically enumerated extraordinary
events. Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 73-1978, §§ 4(b), (c), Dec. 31, 1973. The basis
for calculating a fair return, below which adjustment would be automatically allowed,
was not left to the administrator's discretion, but fixed at assessed value. Miami Beach,
Fla., Ordinance 73-1978, § 4(c)(4)(v), Dec. 31, 1973. The rent administrator was not
permitted to decontrol rents for certain classes of housing at his own discretion, but
could only recommend such action to the city council. Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance
73-1978, § 16, Dec. 31, 1973. Housing violations were treated as grounds for withholding
rent increases rather than ordering decreases. Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 73-1978, §
4(c)(3)(iii), Dec. 31, 1973. Provisions were made for administrative hearings, judicial
review, and maximum duration of the ordinance. Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance
73-1978, §§ 7, 8, 17, Dec. 31, 1973.
12. Forte Towers, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, No. 73-31459 (Fla. Dade Co. Cir.
Ct., Jan. 22, 1974). See notes 28, 29 infra.
13. 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974).
14. Id. at 765. See notes 33-40 and accompanying text infra.
15. Dillon's Rule is as follows: "It is a general and undisputed proposition of
law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and
no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied
in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplish-
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ties within boundaries set out by the legislatures that created them. 16
Home rule is a reaction to the difficulties encountered by both munici-
palities and legislatures under this arrangement. 7 It may become the
national norm. 18
Home rule is of two general types, legislative and constitutional.'9
ment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation,-not simply convenient,
but indispensable." 1 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237, at 448-49 (5th ed.
1911). Dillon's Rule is reflected in Florida case law. See, e.g., Heriot v. City of Pensa-
cola, 146 So. 654, 656 (Fla. 1933); Malone v. City of Quincy, 62 So. 922, 924 (Fla.
1913). See also Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972) (express legislative grant
required to support municipal firearms regulation); St. Joe Natural Gas Co. v. City of
Ward Ridge, 265 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 272 So. 2d 817
(Fla. 1973) (express or implied grant of power required to support city's grant of
exclusive utility franchise); 23 FLA. JUR. Municipal Corporations § 63 (1959). Dillon's
Rule also states: "Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of
power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied." 1 J.
DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237, at 449-50 (5th ed. 1911). The Florida courts
approved: "If reasonable doubt exists as to a particular power of a municipality, it
should be resolved against the city." Liberis v. Harper, 104 So. 853, 854 (Fla. 1925),
cited with approval in City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801,
803 (Fla. 1972). The effect of the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act on this presumption of
invalidity is unresolved under Forte Towers. See note 65 infra. For thorough discussion
of the powers traditionally exercised by Florida municipalities see Sparkman, The History
and Status of Local Government Powers in Florida, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 271 (1973).
16. Florida municipalities have always owed their existence to the legislature. 23
FLA. JUR. Municipal Corporations § 2 (1959). Prior to the adoption of the 1968 constitu-
tion the relationship was spelled out by FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 24 (1885), which provided:
The Legislature shall establish an uniform system of county and municipal
government . . . .The Legislature shall by general law classify cities and towns
according to population, and shall by general law provide for their incorporation,
government, jurisdiction, powers, duties and privileges under such classifica-
tions ....
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8 (1885) provided:
The Legislature shall have power to establish, and to abolish, municipalities to
provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and
to alter or amend the same at any time ....
For a discussion of the complex procedures by which municipalities were legislatively
governed through general laws, special laws, local laws, and laws of local application,
see Sparkman, note 15 supra, at 279-83.
17. A primary purpose of the Act was to eliminate the "local bill evil." 305 So. 2d
at 766; accord, In re Apportionment Law, 281 So. 2d 484, 486 (1973). A striking reduction
in local bills on the legislative agenda, from 42% to 15% of all bills introduced,
appears to be largely attributable to home rule provisions passed in the 1968 constitu-
tion. See Note, Municipal and County Ordinances: Looming Difficulties Under Florida's
New Judicial Article, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 255, 258 n.15 (1974).
18. See Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 20
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 671, 680-81 n.37 (1973), listing nine states other than Florida that
have adopted hone rule in some form sirice 1960. This calculation may be conservative.
See MICH. CONsT. art. VII, § 22 (1963).
19. See Sparkman, note 15 supra, at 283, citing LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COUNCIL RE-
PORT RELATIVE TO MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT),
Mass. Sen, Doc. No. 950, at 36 (March 10, 1965). Constitutionally mandatory, or self-
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Prior to the adoption of the 1968 constitution, Florida home rule was
generally legislative, although certain counties were guaranteed home
rule by constitutional provision.2" The 1968 constitution adopted
home rule in article VIII, section 2(b):
(b) POWERS. Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate
and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal
government, perform municipal functions and render municipal
services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except
as otherwise provided by law. Each municipal legislative body shall
be elective.
In Fleetwood Hotel, the court held section 2(b) was not self-executing
and therefore the municipal charter would continue to be the para-
mount source of municipal power absent additional legislation. Be-
cause the Miami Beach Charter did not expressly provide power to
control rents, and the charter's general welfare clause was held to be
insufficient to provide rent control powers, the court struck the rent
control ordinance. 2
1
The subsequent enactment of the Municipal Home Rule Powers
Act held forth the promise that municipalities might finally deal
with their problems in a creative, efficient manner, without having
to request special authorization in the form of local bills. The ex-
pressed intent of the Act was to fulfill the inchoate constitutional
home rule provision, remove legislative direction, and vest discretion
in the municipalities as to the exercise, terms and conditions of the
powers granted.22 The heart of the Act is contained in section 166.021,
the "Powers" section, which provides in pertinent part:
(1) As provided in § 2(b), Art. VIII of the state constitution,
municipalities shall have the governmental, corporate and propietary
executing, home rule is the stronger type, and legislative home rule based solely on
a statutory grant, the weaker. Under Fleetwood Hotel Florida appears to have a hybrid
type, a non-self-executing constitutional provision that enables the legislature to enact
home rule. See 261 So. 2d at 803-04.
20. Dade and Hillsborough Counties were granted charter-making powers under
FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §§ 11, 24 (1885). Municipalities were governed by art. II1, § 24,
and art. VIII, § 8. See note 16, supra. The provisions of the 1885 constitution providing
county home rule were incorporated in the 1968 constitution. See note 31 infra.
21. 261 So. 2d at 803-04.
22. FLA. STAT. §§ 166.021(4), 166.042(1) (1973). Section 166.021(4) declares that "It
is the further intent of the legislature . . . to remove any limitations, judicially im-
posed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those . . .
expressly prohibited." An attorney general's opinion suggests that this language refers
specifically to Fleetwood Hotel, 1973 FLA. Arr'y GEN. Op. 073-267, at 3.
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powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform
municipal functions, and render municipal services, and may exercise
any power for municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited
by law.
(2) "Municipal purpose" means any activity or power which may
be exercised by the state or its political subdivisions.
Most of the remainder of the "Powers" section concerns excep-
tions and limitations to this authority. Excluded are annexation,
merger and extraterritorial power, and certain changes in municipal
sovereignty or internal structure. 23 Also excluded are subjects expressly
prohibited by the constitution, expressly preempted to the state or
county by the constitution or general law, or preempted by certain
county charters.24 There remains, however, a robust grant of authority.
The constitution or general law forecloses municipal action only as to
subjects that are "expressly" prohibited or preempted; the word "ex-
pressly" is used four times,25 and never qualified by juxtaposition with
"impliedly." Thus those powers which the state possesses but has not
exercised, and powers exercised but not expressly prohibited or pre-
empted, may apparently be exercised by any one of the 400 Florida
municipalities.2 6
23. FLA. STAT. §§ 166.021(3)(a), (4) (1973).
24. FLA. STAT. §§ 166.021(3)(b)-(d) (1973).
25. FLA. STAT. §§ 166.021(l), (3)(b), (c), (4) (1974).
26. This grant of power has an awesome potential for mischief as well as for
virtue. In some constitutional provisions and statutes, the intent to preempt the subject
matter is fairly clear. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 847.09 (1973) (obscenity and profanity). The
vast majority of provisions, however, are not so clear-cut. Some merely vest authority in
a state organ without any mention of local authority. See, e.g,, FLA. STAT. § 624.307 (1973)
(Department of Insurance); FLA. STAT. § 458.01 (1973) (Board of Medical Examiners).
Others vest power in a state body, but expressly encourage consistent local action. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. § 380.021 (1973) (environmental land and water management); FLA.
STAT. § 501'.213 (1973) (deceptive and unfair trade practices). Where should the line
of express preemption be drawn?
Equally complex problems are presented by statutes which contain undefined terms,
and make no mention of municipal authority to provide clarification. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. H9 83.44, .45 (1973), requiring good faith in performance of a residential rental
agreement and disallowing unconscionable agreements. Can Miami Beach clarify these
terms, and thereby impose more rights and duties on the landlord or tenant?
While statutes can be easily amended to provide express preemption, constitutional
provisions are not so easily altered. One such troublesome provision is FLA. CONsT. art.
III, § 11, which prohibits special laws or general laws of local application pertaining
to such subjects as assessment and collection of taxes, rules of evidence and punish-
ment, private contractual liens, private incorporation, and occupations regulated by
state agencies. Can the legislature legitimate municipal action where it cannot enact
special legislation? At least one public official feels this is not authorized. Interview with
Gerald L. Knight, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Legal Affairs, in Tallahassee,
December 12, 1974.
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In Forte Towers, a short per curiam opinion upheld the Act, citing
reasons set forth in the separate opinion by Justice Dekle. 7 The
Dekle opinion spoke for a unanimous court on the constitutionality
of the Act and the power of municipalities to enact rent controls
thereunder. The opinion rejected arguments that the Act was an in-
valid usurpation of judicial power to define municipal purpose, 8 or
Problems may also result if ordinances conflict with common law. FLA. STAT. § 2.01
(1973) enacts the common law, and Florida courts have long held that an ordinance
may not " 'be inconsistent with common law, equity and public policy, unless ex-
ceptions are permitted . . . .' McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd Ed., page 119."
Blitch v. City of Ocala, 195 So. 406, 407 (Fla. 1940), quoted in Griffin v. Sharpe, 65
So. 2d 751, 752 (Fla. 1953), and Miami Shores Village v. Wm. N. Brockway Post No. 124,
24 So. 2d 33, 35 (Fla. 1945). Because the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act postdated
both the treatise and these cases, there may be some doubt as to whether municipalities
have been given new powers to create a cause, remedy or procedural right, and if so,
in what cases.
There is also the public policy problem of intermunicipal conflicts. The freedom
of municipalities to enact conflicting ordinances may depend upon: (1) the degree
of physical proximity and interrelation of particular municipalities; (2) the extent
to which they are governed by an existing metropolitan or regional authority; and (3)
the necessity or desirability of uniformity on particular issues, especially those having
extraterritorial effects. Potential problem areas include commercial licensing and
practices, nuisance and pollution control, and statutory negligence. Such problems are
particularly difficult if municipal ordinances are not easily accessible to the public.
These difficulties are discussed in Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private
Law Exception, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 671 (1973). The number of potential conflicts is
given by the formula N = (C-C) -- 2, where N is the number of conflicts and C the
number of jurisdictions. Id. at 759 n.400.
Finally, what is the effect of the Act on such statutory language as "except as provided
by general law"? See, e.g., FLA. CONsT. art. VII, § l(a), preempting all forms of taxation
other than ad valorem taxation to the states except as provided by general law. This
section might be read in pari materia with FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 9(a) and FLA. STAT.
§§ 166.021, 212.081(3)(b) (1973) to authorize municipalities to levy excise taxes on sales,
admissions, and leases.
27. 305 So. 2d at 765.
28. The trial court had ruled that the entire "Powers" section of the Act was
invalid because a subsection defined municipal purpose as "any activity or power
which may be exercised by the state or its political subdivisions." FLA. STAT. § 166.021(2)
(1973). Such a definition, the trial court held, constituted an improper delegation
of legislative authority in that it empowered municipalities to deal in matters "in-
herently reserved to the state alone," such as master-servant and landlord-tenant relation-
ships, and probate law. Forte Towers, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, No. 73-31459, at 2 (Fla.
Dade Co. Cir. Ct., Jan. 22, 1974). Appellee pressed this argument on appeal, noting
that FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 1 vests the state's legislative power in the legislature, and
the constitution does not authorize the legislature to delegate that power. Thus, appellee
argued, the Act was void as "an unconstitutional attempt to completely abdicate a con-
stitutionally vested power and duty." Brief for Appellee at 15, City of Miami Beach
v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974).
Justice Dekle, however, noted that the grant of power was provided not by the
definitional subsection, but by FLA. STAT. § 166.021(1) (1973), which expressly em-
powers municipalities to "exercise any power for municipal purposes, except when
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delegation of legislative powers reserved to the state.2 9 The opinion
held that the Act constituted the additional legislation required by
Fleetwood Hotel to empower municipalities to enact rent control
ordinances' 5 and that the Act was applicable to Miami Beach despite
constitutional provisions granting a charter to Dade County. 1 The
expressly prohibited by law." 305 So. 2d at 766. The Dekle opinion then held that
rent control, given sufficient justifying conditions, was a proper municipal purpose.
Id. Because rent control was judicially cognizable as a proper municipal purpose,
the Dekle opinion declined to decide whether the definitional section of the act was
overbroad. Id. As a proper municipal purpose not expressly prohibited by law, the
Dekle opinion held that rent control fell within § 166.021(l)'s grant of power. Id.
29. In response to the holding below invalidating the Act on this ground, the
Dekle opinion stated:
[T]he trial court failed to apply the rule that statutes will be so construed as to
uphold their constitutional validity whenever possible. And here the statute may
be upheld, for F.S. § 166.021(3)(c) expressly excludes from the grant of power
to municipalities "any subject expressly preempted to state or county government
by the constitution or by general law." Thus even if a rent control ordinance
which was passed under the authority of [the Act] should seek to regulate such
a matter preempted by the State, it would be invalid to that extent under the
terms of the authorizing statute itself. While a provision of that nature would
require the invalidating of such a provision of the statute, it does not necessitate
or even justify a finding that the total statute is invalid.
305 So. 2d at 767 (footnote omitted).
30. Id. Some language in Fleetwood had indicated "specific" or "express" state
authorization would be required to empower municipalities to enact rent control
ordinances. See 261 So. 2d at 804. The Dekle opinion relied not on specific statutory
language, but on a finding, supported by the Act's legislative history, of specific legisla-
tive intent to grant municipalities rent control powers. See note 52 and accompanying
text infra.
In concluding that the Act empowered municipalities to enact rent control ordinances,
the Dekle opinion noted that an attorney general's opinion had reached a similar con-
clusion. The attorney general's opinion, however, relied heavily on the definitional
subsection of the Act-a subsection the Dekle opinion expressly declined to consider.
See 1973 FLA. Arr'Y GEN. op. 073-267, at 5; note 28 supra.
31. 305 So. 2d at 767. It had been argued that even if the Act were valid, FLA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e) and FLA. STAT. § 166.021(3)(d) (1973) rendered the Act in-
applicable to Miami Beach. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 6(e) provides that all provisions
of the Metropolitan Dade County Home Rule Charter shall continue to be valid
if authorized under FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 11 (1885), and that § 11 of the former
constitution will remain in full force. It was argued that, pursuant to the Metro County
Charter, rent control powers could be granted to a Dade County municipality only
by municipal charter amendment. In response Justice Dekle held that although § 5.03
of the Metro County Charter controls amendment of Dade County municipal charters,
charter amendment was not the only procedure for conferring additional powers on a
Dade County city. Since the Metro County Charter provides that each municipality
may exercise all powers not inconsistent with the charter, Justice Dekle held that the
legislature could properly confer additional powers on a Dade County city provided
those powers did not conflict with the county charter. Justice Dekle then found that
the municipal rent controls did not conflict with the county charter.
FLA. STAT. § 166.021(3)(d) (1973) exempts from the grant of municipal powers
subjects preempted to a county pursuant to county charter adopted under constitutional
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Act therefore conferred on Miami Beach the power to pass a rent
control ordinance.3 2
The subsequent treatment of the ordinance suggests the problems
municipalities may encounter in attempting to exercise rent control
powers granted by the Act. The court struck the ordinance, as it had
in Fleetwood Hotel, because the ordinance lacked "sufficient" guide-
lines and hence was an unlawful delegation of municipal legislative
power." In Fleetwood Hotel, the guidelines were held to be insufficient
because they lacked objective standards and thus gave the city rent
agency excessive discretion in enforcing the ordinance. 4 In Forte
Towers, the guidelines were held to be insufficient because they were
found to be confiscatory, arbitrary, and unreasonable by Justices
Dekle, Roberts, Boyd, and Overton.3 5
The per curiam opinion did not elaborate on the finding of in-
sufficient guidelines. Instead, it again referred to the special con-
currence of Justice Dekle. Justice Dekle accepted the trial court's
finding that the ordinance was unambiguous, 3 16 but noted that the pur-
pose of rent control was to stablize rentals and prevent extortionate
rent increases during inflationary periods while allowing landlords a
fair return on their investment.3 7 He found the guidelines to be so
fixed and arbitrary that the administrator could not allow a fair re-
turn to landlords in certain situations, and thereby avoid confiscatory
effects .3 However, the Dekle opinion did suggest that guidelines could
authority. justice Dekle held that this subsection was inapplicable because Dade County
had not preempted rent control powers.
32. 305 So. 2d at 768.
33. Id. at 765.
34. 261 So. 2d at 805-06.
35. See 305 So. 2d at 765 (per curiam opinion); id. at 768-69 (Dekle, J., concurring);
id. at 771-72 (Overton, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 765.
37. Id. at 768, citing Foti v. Heller, 137 A.2d 10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957). See
also Kress, Dunlap & Lane, Ltd. v. Downing, 193 F. Supp. 874, 880 (D.V.I. 1961).
38. 305 So. 2d at 768. The Dekle opinion stated that the city council may have been
"overly conscientous in its efforts to spell out everything," and that "needed in such
an ordinance is a greater flexibility." Id. The city may have overreacted to the
Fleetwood Hotel court's finding, 261 So. 2d at 805-06, of insufficient guidelines.
The constitutional perils of inflexible rent control provisions were noted in dicta
in Kress, Dunlap & Lane, Ltd. v. Downing, 193 F. Supp. 874 (D.V.I. 1961). There the
court called attention to rent control provisions, not before the court, that authorized
approval of landlords' applications for rent increases only to compensate landlords
for structural changes and capital improvements. The court stated, "Unless these statu-
tory provisions are to be construed by the courts or amended by the Legislature so as to
authorize the fixing of a rent which is fair and reasonable to both landlord and
tenant under all the circumstances of each case, they would seem plainly to be invalid
as depriving the landlord of the fair value of his property without due process of law."
Id. at 886.
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be promulgated that would avoid due process pitfalls."s It thus seems
possible for Miami Beach to frame a valid rent control ordinance,
provided the ordinance contains objective guidelines as required
by Fleetwood Hotel and those guidelines incorporate criteria suggested
by case law alluded to in Forte Towers.40
Forte Towers may thus prove most helpful to municipalities at-
tempting to regulate and protect local housing markets. Emergency
rent control is a valuable adjunct to housing code enforcement, zoning,
and the set of powers41 by which a city can provide low-income housing
or encourage private parties to do so. As land useable for residential
The specific provisions to which the Dekle opinion objected involved limitations
on rent increases. Under the ordinance, a landlord was eligible for an increase only
if his net return was less than six percent of the assessed valuation of his property.
Net return was to be calculated by subtracting operating expenses from earned income.
However, mortgage interest, amortization, depreciation and debt service were not to be
included in operating expenses. Miami Beach, Fla. Ordinance 73-1978 § 4(c)(4)(v), Dec.
31, 1973. Justice Dekle reasoned that assessed valuation is an inadequate basis for
computing fair return, since property may be underassessed (although possibly in viola-
tion of FLA. STAT. § 193.011 (1973)) and assessments often fail to reflect current value.
305 So. 2d at 769. Justice Dekle noted that the net effect of undervaluation and the
operating expense exclusions was to require appellees to incur considerable losses to
qualify for an increase. Id. Such results, Justice Dekle stated, "simply do not
square with the requirements of due process; they would constitute confiscation beyond
the control of the Administrator under the tools he is given to work with." Id.
Justice Ervin's dissent, joined by Justices Adkins and McCain, pointed out that
the landlord might bring his property to full assessed value by submitting a lawful
tax return. Id. at 772. Note, however, that section 4(c)(4)(v) of the ordinance used for its
basis assessed valuation on October 1, 1973, or three months prior to enactment. And
even if the freeze date were judicially readjusted, as suggested by Justice Ervin, id., full
assessed valuation might not reflect fair market value at the time an increase was
sought.
Justice Dekle's view that assessed valuation is an improper basis for measuring
fair return on a landlord's investment is supported by cases holding that rent increase
formulas must be based on present fair market value. Karrick v. Cantrill, 277 F. 578
(D.C. Cir. 1921); Hirsch v. Weiner, 190 N.Y.S. 111 (Sup. Ct. 1921). It also seems clear
that depreciation must be included in operating expenses. See id. But Justice Dekle's
implication, 305 So. 2d at 769, that mortgage interest should be considered a deductible
operating expense conflicts with prior decisions. In the Hirsch case, the court stated:
The landlords should not be allowed to charge as an operating expense the
interest paid on mortgages, or expense in negotiating mortgages. The reason for
this is apparent. The landlord is getting a return on his total investment which
includes that part represented by the mortgages in the property, which must be
paid to save the amount actually advanced.
190 N.Y.S. 111, 117; accord Kress, Dunlap & Lane, Ltd. v. Downing, supra, at 883, 886.
39. 305 So. 2d at 768; see also note 40 infra.
40. For discussion of criteria appropriate to assuring fair return on the landlord's
investment, see Karrick v. Cantrill, 277 F. 578 (D.C. Cir. 1921); Kress, Dunlap & Lane,
Ltd. v. Downing, 193 F. Supp. 874 (D.V.I. 1961); Hirsch v. Weiner, 190 N.Y.S. 111 (Sup.
Ct. 1921). See also note 38 supra.
41. For example, condemnation and subsidy.
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purposes becomes more scarce, some cities may find that barriers to
entry prevent the traditional market checks on unwarranted rent in-
creases. Inasmuch as the repercussions of private decisions in the
housing market (including misallocation of income and displacement
of persons) are primarily local rather than statewide, it is logical that
a local government have the legal authority to exercise those powers
which the state might exercise in a statewide emergency. This un-
spoken rationale for emergency municipal rent control might also
support other measures to protect the local housing supply, such
as conditioning building permits for luxury housing on the provision of
a certain number of low-rent units.
But, taken as a whole, Forte Towers does not authorize a rash of
municipal activity in heretofore forbidden areas. Fleetwood Hotel
was overturned to the extent that it allowed only action authorized by
municipal charter.4 2 Although Forte Towers acknowledged the Act's
broad grant of home rule authority to municipalities,4 3 there is a
leitmotif of caution throughout the opinions. There are no broad
dicta about the virtues of home rule. Nor did the court suggest what
powers, other than rent control, have been conferred by the Act.
44
However, the tests applied by Justice Dekle to the Miami Beach
ordinance may provide municipalities with clues as to what ordinances
will withstand judicial scrutiny. Those tests include:
1. Existence of Valid Municipal Purpose.-Article VIII, section
2(b) of the constitution allows municipalities to "exercise any power
for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law." The
Act's "Powers" section contains similar language. Thus existence of
a valid municipal purpose is both a constitutional and a statutory
prerequisite to the exercise of home rule powers. Although municipal
purpose is not defined by the constitution, it is defined by the Act as
"any activity or power which may be exercised by the state or its
political subdivisions.."
45
The Dekle opinion did not rule on the validity of the Act's
definitional subsection. Municipalities relying on the definitional sub-
section to establish municipal purpose may argue that the subsection
42. 305 So. 2d at 768.
43. The Dekle opinion twice referred to the "broad grant of power" of the Act.
Id. at 766, 767. Similar language was used in In re Apportionment Law, 281 So. 2d 484, 486
(Fla. 1973).
44. The Dekle opinion did note, however, that "the intent of [the Act] was
largely to eliminate the 'local bill evil' . . . . ... 305 So. 2d, Citing In re Apportion-
ment Law, 281 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1973). See also note 17 supra. The Act should encompass,
then, at least those powers which have previously been the proper subject of local and
special legislation.
45. FLA. STAT. § 166.021(2) (1973).
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is a legislative definition of a constitutional term, and therefore is
controlling so long as the definition bears a reasonable relationship
to constitutional purposes.4 6 But municipalities relying on the subsec-
tion must be prepared to confront the argument, raised in Forte
Towers,' 7 that determination of proper municipal purpose is for the
judiciary.48 In Forte Towers, the court avoided resolving such issues
by recognizing judicially that rent control was a municipal purpose,
citing a leading treatise on municipal corporations and case law from
other jurisdictions. 49 Municipalities should therefore seek judicial ex-
pansion of the municipal purpose concept in addition to relying on the
statutory definition.
2. Lack of Expressly Prohibited or Preempted Purposes.-By the
terms of the Act, ordinances will be ultra vires if their subject matter
is "expressly prohibited" or "expressly preempted" by general law or
the constitution.50 The Dekle opinion offered no guidance as to the
meaning of these terms, simply concluding that rent control was not
prohibited. 51 This conclusion was buttressed by reference to the Act's
legislative history-notably the defeat of an amendment which would
have excluded rent control from the Act's grant of powers.52 In cases
where the Act's legislative intent is less clear, the court should examine
closely the intent of potentially conflicting statutes to determine what
matters are prohibited or preempted.53 Saving the constitutionality of
the Act in future cases may require an expansive reading of the words
"expressly preempted. ' ' 5 4
46. See Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. State ex rel. Boone, 234 So. 2d 665,
670 (Fla. 1970); Jasper v. Mease Manor, Inc., 208 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1968).
47. Brief for Appellee at 10-12.
48. The Forte Towers court found it unnecessary to reach this contention. See
note 28 supra. It might also be argued that the legislative definition is so broad that,
in effect, definition of municipal purpose is left to municipalities and therefore is sub-
ject to careful judicial review. Cf. City of Bradentown v. State, 102 So. 556, 557 (Fla. 1924).
49. The Dekle opinion cited Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 293 A.2d 720 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1972); Warren v. City of Philadelphia, 115 A.2d 218 (Pa. 1955); and 7 E.
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 24.563(d) (1928). 305 So. 2d at 766.
50. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
51. 305 So. 2d at 767.
52. Id. The rejected amendment also would have denied municipalities power
to control wages and prices.
53. The pitfalls of a preemption doctrine are illustrated by case law on federal
preemption of interstate commerce regulation, where a balancing of interest test is
used. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). This approach en-
tails deep involvement in the minutiae of fact situations. See, e.g., City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Term., Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
54. See note 26 supra. The questions raised therein suggest that in some cases
findings of preemption may be required even though the phrase "expressly preempted"
is absent from constitutional or statutory provisions.
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3. Lack of Conflict with County Charters.-A third consideration
raised by the Dekle opinion is whether the municipal ordinance con-
flicts with a county home rule charter adopted pursuant to the con-
stitution.55 Where the charter prohibits the action embodied in the
proposed ordinance, the ordinance would be unconstitutional; if the
county charter preempts the field the ordinance would be ultra vires.
Mere "preemption" as well as "'express preemption" may invalidate
the ordinance. 5 The preemption provisions could thus make it possible
for a county to keep municipalities in check by amending the county
charter.
4. Lack of Due Process Defects.-Municipal ordinances are
presumptively valid if they are within municipal power.5 7 But the
Dekle opinion makes it clear that this presumption and the Act's
broad grant of power will not shield ordinances from due process
attacks. In Forte Towers, due process defects5 led the court to con-
clude that the ordinance lacked "sufficient guidelines and standards"
and hence was an unlawful delegation of municipal authority.55 In con-
sidering due process issues, the court may also look to the sufficiency
of preconditions to the exercise of the police power. In Forte Towers,
the majority accepted the trial court's finding that an emergency-a
prerequisite to rent control-existed. But two justices took strong
issue with the majority on this point,6° and in cases involving less
compelling fact situations6 existence of a precondition may became a
central issue.
5. Lack of Statutory Conflicts.-Finally, the court might find that
55. 305 So. 2d at 767-68. See note 31 supra.
56. FLA. STAT. §§ 166.021(3)(c), (4) (1973).
57. 23 FLA. Jut. Municipal Corporations §§ 102-03 (1959).
58. Though the Dekle opinion found the ordinance's guidelines to be confiscatory,
arbitrary and unreasonable, it elaborated only the confiscation issue. Justice Ervin's
dissenting opinion also was concerned primarily with the confiscation issue. See note
38 supra. 
.
59. 305 So. 2d at 765.
60. Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Boyd, stressed that rent control was a drastic
measure, to be exercised only in extreme situations. Id. at 770. Justice Roberts
took the view that rent control had been authorized not because of an emergency, but
"for the convenience of tenants who are living in accommodations apparently beyond
their financial ability." Id. at 772. Justice Roberts' view of the emergency issue stands
in derogation of case authority treating municipal declarations of emergency as con-
clusive. See, e.g., Glackman v. City of Miami Beach, 51 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1951); State
ex rel. Swift v. Dillon, 79 So. 29 (Fla. 1918).
61. The circuit court, in upholding the city council's finding of emergency, stated:
"[I]f it were not for the highly extraordinary, unusual and unique factual situation
existing in the South Beach area . . . the Court's opinion and determination of the
question [might] have been different." Forte Towers, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach,
No. 73-31459, at 4-5 (Fla. Dade Co. Cir. Ct., Jan. 22, 1974).
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even though a field of law is not expressly preempted, an ordinance con-
tains provisions conflicting with specific statutory provisions and there-
fore is invalid. In Fleetwood Hotel, the first Miami Beach ordinance
was struck for conflict with statutory landlord-tenant provisions6 2 Al-
though similar claims were advanced in Forte Towers, the issue was
not reached by the court.6 3 Arguments relying on the Fleetwood Hotel
rationale of statutory conflicts thus remain a threat to municipal
ordinances.
In Forte Towers, the court upheld an overwhelming legislative
mandate 4 for home rule in the face of a strong challenge. Yet only
rent control was specifically held to be within the Act's grant of power,
and the court did not indicate whether the Act altered the presump-
tions previously applicable to municipal ordinances.65 Though it
62. Fleetwood Hotel found conflict between an ordinance provision making it un-
lawful to remove housing units from the market if an eviction would result and
general law provisions governing duration and termination of tenancies. 261 So. 2d at
806. See Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 1791 § 16A.5.D, Oct. 15, 1969; FLA. STAT. §§
83.03, .04, .06, .20 (1973). The Fleetwood Hotel court stated:
Municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the
State and must not conflict therewith. If doubt exists as to the extent of a
power attempted to be exercised which may affect the operation of a state
statute, the doubt is to be resolved against the ordinance and in favor of the
statute.
261 So. 2d at 806 (citations omitted).
63. 305 So. 2d at 768, 769; Brief for Appellee at 30-41, City of Miami Beach v. Forte
Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974). Without alluding to specific provisions
of the ordinance, appellee contended the ordinance conflicted with FLA. CONST. art. III,
§ 11(a)(3), (4), (7), (9) (prohibited special laws); FLA. STAT. §§ 83.43(3), (4), (6)
(1973) (definitions of landlord, tenant and rent); FLA. STAT. §§ 83.46, .57, .58, .59 (1973)
(termination of tenancies); and FLA. STAT. §§ 83.55, 85.011, 713.691 (1973) (landlord's
remedies and lien for rent). Appellee further claimed that ordinance provisions
governing disposition of a tenant's rights on his death violated constitutional limitations
on special and local legislation. See Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 73-1978 § 14, Dec.
31, 1975; FLA. CONsT. art. III, §§ ll(a)(13), (18).
64. The Senate passed the Act by a vote of 35 to 2. FLA. S. JounR. 775. (1973). The
House passed the Act by a vote of 97 to 8. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1331 (1973). The 1974 session
of the legislature also passed enabling legislation, although counties were the primary
beneficiaries. See COMMISSION ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT, FINAL REPORT 2 (1974). The trend
in favor of municipal home rule is somewhat dampened by the judicial reorganization
provisions of the state constitution, which require that ordinances be enforced in state
courts and that municipal courts be phased out. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §§ 1, 20 (1973).
Article V, § 17 requires that municipal ordinances be enforced by state attorneys unless
otherwise provided in the general law. For discussion see Note, Municipal and County
Ordinances: Looming Difficulties Under Florida's New judicial Article, 26 U. FLA. L.
REv. 255 (1974).
65. Previously, any doubts as to the existence of a municipal power have been
resolved against the municipality, but ordinances were presumed to be valid if within
municipal power. See notes 15, 57 supra. These presumptions were not expressly
applied in the Dekle opinion. Indeed, the Dekle opinion may be read as virtually
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might reasonably be assumed that the Municipal Home Rule Powers
Act gives municipal ordinances a strong presumption of validity, the
battery of tests applied by the court suggest otherwise. If the court
chooses, it may limit the Act by attacking its flanks, using the methods
outlined above on a case-by-case basis. In the course of defining the
Act's outer boundaries, Forte Towers will be cited and analyzed again
and again by courts and litigants. The initiative now clearly lies with
the cities. They may take heart in the fact that a previously un-
sympathetic court at least did not expressly discourage municipalities
from flexing their new muscles.
DAVID K. MILLER
Uniform Commercial Code-SEcURED TRANSACTIONS-PRIORITY OF PER-
FECTED SECURITY INTEREST IN AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY OVER CON-
FLICTING PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST NOT TIMELY FILED IS
LIMITED TO DEBTOR'S EQUITY IN COLLATERAL.-International Harvest-
er Credit Corp. v. American National Bank, 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1974).
On April 8, 1969, Machek Farms, Inc. executed an installment
note and security agreement with the American National Bank. The
agreement encumbered all property thereafter acquired by Machek.
Two days later the bank filed a financing statement concerning the
agreement. Under a retail installment contract dated April 25, 1969,
Machek purchased and received from the Florida Truck and Tractor
Company (FTT) two items of farm equipment, each having a pur-
chase price of slightly less than $2,000. FTT filed no financing state-
ment concerning this transaction. On August 8, 1969, under a similar
contract with the same company, Machek purchased and received
seven more items of farm equipment. Four of those items had a
purchase price below $2,500; three had a price in excess of that figure.
FTT assigned the August 8 contract to the International Harvester
Credit Corporation (IHCC), which filed a financing statement on
September 3, 1969. Machek subsequently defaulted on payment of
the installment note and on both contracts made with FTT. After
Machek voluntarily returned the equipment purchased under both
reversing them; if future cases follow the pattern of Forte Towers, municipalities will
have less difficulty establishing new powers under the Act than defending the means
chosen, to exercise those powers.
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